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This paper analyzes the policy debate over the Federal Government’s 
bailout of the financial industry in 2008. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA), generally 
known as the “bailout plan,” allocates $700 billion of public money to keep 
financial institutions solvent.  The Act, passed by Congress on October 3, 
2008, has given birth to many programs designed to stabilize the economy.  
The Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP) was the first of the new 
programs to disburse government funds and remains the biggest and most 
controversial program to date.  The Treasury Department’s authority to 
administer funds through TARP was extended through October 2010.1  As 
of January 6, 2010, some $374 billion in public funds have been spent 
through TARP, of which $165 billion have been repaid.2  Although many 
details of the plan have changed since October 2008, the thrust remains the 
same: the federal government is disbursing Treasury funds to secure 
financial markets, enable lending, and keep some of the nation’s largest 
banks in business.3  Many supporters of the plan argue that some banks have 
such influence on national and global economics that they cannot be allowed 
to fail.4  Conversely, critics charge that policy based on this “too big to fail” 
premise is unfair, inefficient, and risky.5  The purpose of this paper is to 
analyze the debate between opponents and proponents of federal 
government’s intervention in financial markets. 
The crux of the debate is whether government intervention encourages 
irresponsible risk-taking and invites other industries to seek federal 
handouts.  This is known as moral hazard.  Both proponents and opponents 
of intervention alike have claimed the highest possible stakes.  Proponents 
have argued that without government intervention in our financial markets a 
chain reaction of institutional failures would have followed, bringing about a 
worldwide depression.6  Opponents counter that government bailouts help 
* Kevin Simons (M.P.P. 2009/M.D.R. 2010) is a conflict resolution specialist with the Asian Pacific 
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only to establish a precedent that reduces public welfare and damages public 
trust.7
II.  ROOTS OF THE CRISIS 
The current financial crisis stems from the debt market, which has 
grown rapidly in the past decade to include exotic, poorly understood 
investment instruments.  Sub-prime mortgages, home loans that banks made 
to borrowers with bad credit, support a crumbling tower of debt.  Years of 
low interest rates made borrowing nearly free for banks, but low rates also 
brought low returns on safe investments like government treasury bills.8  
Banks therefore sought greater returns by issuing home loans at high rates to 
high-risk borrowers.  Mortgage lenders, newly freed from the responsibility 
of collecting mortgage payments, then sold pools of loans to investors who 
used the mortgage payment streams to securitize new instruments, which 
were in turn sold to other investors.  The result is a derivative, “a risk 
transfer agreement, the value of which is derived from the value of an 
underlying asset.”9  This specific type of derivative is known generically as 
a collateralized debt obligation (CDO).10
Derivatives are not subject to the same regulation as common stocks.  
They are not, for example, traded on a market exchange as normal stocks 
and bonds are, but are bought and sold privately “over the counter,” beyond 
the glare of public and regulatory scrutiny.11  Consequently, it is difficult to 
estimate derivatives’ true value.  Nevertheless, the global derivatives market 
was estimated at $596 trillion as of the end of 2007.12 By comparison, global 
GDP for 2008 was $61 trillion.13  The result is a complex and lightly 
regulated market with outstanding obligations approximately ten times the 
value of all goods and services produced worldwide.  Because of the large 
derivatives market, suspect mortgages have become the engine of a lucrative 
and explosive sector of high finance.  This is the genesis of the current 
crisis.14
Compounding the payoff for investment banks and hedge funds are 
credit default swaps (CDSs), a risk transfer contract meant to secure debt 
instruments like CDOs.15  CDSs are essentially a type of private insurance.  
The idea is fairly simple: Party A takes out insurance against the potential 
default of a credit issue, like a bond, mortgage, or CDO, and in exchange for 
providing that insurance, Party B receives a revenue stream in the form of 
premium payments from Party A.  In the event of a credit default, Party B is 
liable to pay Party A some multiple of the premium.16  The market for CDSs 
grew from roughly $1 trillion in 2001 to $62 trillion in 2007.17  Unlike 
conventional insurance, however, CDSs are unregulated.18  A more 
damaging consequence is that many CDSs are “guaranteed” by parties 
lacking the capital to do so; in financial parlance they are 
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“undercapitalized.”19  Indeed, the market for all financial derivatives has put 
vastly more money at risk than there is underlying value to secure it.  
Therefore, commentators often refer to the “notional value” of derivatives. 
Investors, mainly investment banks and hedge funds, profited from this 
system well into 2006, as the U.S. housing market continued to soar20.  As 
long as borrowers were able to sell their homes at a profit or refinance their 
loans there was little risk of default.  Eventually, however, the housing 
market cooled and heavily leveraged hedge funds, often running investment 
to capital ratios of 100 to 1, incurred heavy losses.21  This problem was 
exacerbated by the fact that some insurers of CDSs were charging only 1% 
premiums.22  The brokerage firm Bear Stearns (Bear) announced the 
collapse of two of its hedge funds in July of 2007.23  Bear’s fortunes 
deteriorated over the coming months until the investment bank JPMorgan 
Chase bought the distressed firm with a Federal Reserve Bank loan in March 
2008.24  Fannie Mae (Federal National Mortgage Association) and Freddie 
Mac (Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation), two quasi-governmental 
mortgage-lending agencies, also suffered heavy losses in the sub-prime 
market.25  Faced with the prospect of seeing the two agencies default on 
their obligations, and thus calling the credit-worthiness of the federal 
government into question, the Federal Reserve (Fed) and the Office of 
Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight placed Freddie and Fannie into 
conservatorship on September 7, 2008.26
Merrill Lynch also suffered heavy losses and was sold, with assistance 
from the Fed, to Bank of America on September 14, 2008.27  Lehman 
Brothers was unable to secure government intervention and filed for 
bankruptcy on the September 15, 2008.28  The Lehman filing is the largest 
bankruptcy in U.S. history at over $600 billion in liabilities,29 and stock 
market indexes suffered heavy losses as a result of the news of Lehman’s 
bankruptcy.30  Consequently, the Fed’s failure to intervene has been widely 
criticized31.  In the immediate wake of Lehman’s filing for bankruptcy, the 
Fed announced it would provide $85 billion in loans to the insurance giant 
American International Group (AIG).  Bear Stearns, Merrill Lynch, and AIG 
had been deemed too big to fail, and a broader bailout plan was in the offing.  
Speculation, leverage, and lax regulation had endowed sub-prime mortgages 
with the power to topple a network of financial giants. 
III.  LITERATURE REVIEW: CURRENT SITUATION 
The seismic events of the past couple of years have renewed the debate 
on the moral hazards of government intervention in a market economy.  The 
main architect of the bailout is Henry J. Paulson, former Secretary of the 
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Treasury of the United States.32  Another key policymaker is Federal 
Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke, whose agency opened its discount 
window to commercial banks for the first time when it lent Morgan Stanley 
$28.8 billion in March 2008 to buy Bear Stearns.33  In addition to making 
new sources of “emergency money” available to Wall Street, Mr. Bernanke 
also moved to alleviate the crisis by lowering interest rates to encourage 
lending.34
Originally, the Treasury’s stated policy was to use some of the money, 
as much as $250 billion, to buy the worst mortgage-backed assets that banks 
held.35  However, the Treasury reversed course and decided instead to 
purchase preferred stock from ailing banks as a way to provide capital, 
encourage lending, and ease the credit crunch.  This also gave the 
government a firmer idea of its potential return on investment.  The 
government acted quickly, purchasing some $115 billion worth of preferred 
stock from eight of the largest banks within three weeks of EESA’s 
passing.36  That figure has risen to $205 billion in the past year, exclusive of 
AIG, which the U.S. government now effectively owns.37  These “equity 
injections” come at a cost of graduated interest rates to the banks, and more 
than half of the $205 billion has been repaid.38  With the extension of 
TARP’s authority until October 2010, the Treasury will likely spend 
additional funds as needed throughout 2010, although it is unlikely that 
Treasury will spend the full $700 billion.39  Additional plans for loan 
workouts and buying preferred stock on matching terms with private 
investment have since begun, although on a smaller scale and with less 
fanfare.40
IV.  PROS OF THE PLAN 
Proponents claim government intervention was necessary because of the 
extreme circumstances.  Some arguments in favor of the bailout plan are that 
the entire economy is at stake, and that government action will fix 
institutional flaws. 
A.  Pragmatism: The Entire Economy Is At Stake 
Secretary Paulson’s first and most important point when he testified 
before the Senate Banking Committee on September 23, 2008 was that the 
bailout was needed because the entire economy is at stake.  He told the 
Committee that, “We must [enact this plan] in order to avoid a continuing 
series of financial institution failures and frozen credit markets that threaten 
American families’ financial well-being, the viability of businesses both 
small and large, and the very health of our economy.”41  The Secretary was 
careful to frame the economic stability argument in terms of Main Street’s 
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benefit.42  With credit markets frozen, business grinds to a halt.  General 
Electric (GE), an icon of American capitalism, struggled to make payroll at 
the height of the September 2008 panic.43  Had another bank gone bankrupt, 
GE might well have gone under with it; the wider impact that GE’s failure 
could have had on other businesses great and small is incalculable.  Without 
credit, manufacturers can no longer borrow to finance production, retailers 
cannot borrow to purchase goods for sale, consumers lose purchasing power, 
employers default on payroll, and student loans dry up.  This argument tries 
to divert the attention from Wall Street greed to the potentially severe impact 
that a financial markets crisis could inflict on those who would otherwise 
expect to be unaffected by the world of high finance. 
Charles Wyplosz, Professor of International Economics at the Graduate 
Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva, drives this 
argument home by writing: “all financial institutions will have no choice but 
to formally acknowledge their losses.  Either they recapitalise quickly, 
which dilutes existing shares, or they will file for bankruptcy, which is even 
worse for the shareholders.”44  Again the proponents make the claim that 
this bailout is not just for the benefit of the banks and corporations who 
brought this problem to bear on the rest of the world, but is in fact the best 
option for shareholders.  Wyplosz, like Paulson, attempts to connect the 
poorly understood world of CDOs and CDSs to the average consumer.  
Without the bailout, retirement savings could be wiped out.45  The Dow 
Jones one-day plunge on September 29, 2008, for example, resulted in $1.2 
trillion in losses.46  The interests of the broader economy are at stake, not 
just the bonuses of Wall Street’s executives.  It is a populist argument that 
was embraced by U.S. Senator John McCain and then-U.S. Senator Barack 
Obama, both of whom voted for the plan.47
B.  Government Action Will Fix Institutional Flaws 
Secretary Paulson addressed the notion that government action will help 
to fix institutional flaws directly in his November 12, 2008 statement on the 
crisis and the evolving plan.48  He stated that “it is already clear that we 
must address a number of significant issues, such as improving risk 
management practices, compensation practices, oversight of mortgage 
origination and the securitization process, credit rating agencies, OTC 
derivative market infrastructure and regulatory policies, practices and 
regimes in our respective countries.”49  Indeed, in Europe regulatory reform 
is seen as an essential component of righting their markets.50  Executive 
compensation tied to profit encourages excessive risk-taking; lax regulations 
that allow 100 to 1 leveraging invite disaster.  Hedge funds are not subject to 
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the same capital reserve requirements that apply to banks, thus their 
exposure, or potential to gain or lose money, is greatly magnified.51  This 
leveraging power is exacerbated when credit rating agencies like Moody’s 
and Standard and Poors assign “safe” ratings to bad debt, as many allege has 
happened in recent years.52  The current plan does not, however, impose new 
mortgage lending rules on America’s banks, nor have new rules been 
promulgated to enforce capital ratios on hedge funds. 
V.  SHORTCOMINGS OF THE PLAN 
Some arguments against the current bailout plan are that it creates moral 
hazard and that the plan is badly flawed. 
A.  Moral Hazard 
Many opponents of the EESA argue against any government 
intervention.53  In their view, companies that have made risky investments 
should be allowed to fail.  Such critics abhor moral hazard.  A responsible 
government cannot, they argue, come to the aid of the irresponsible because 
it provides a safety net for excessive risk-taking.  Others are opposed to the 
structural details of the plan.54  The core of this argument is simple: bailing 
out a misbehaving institution is just plain wrong.  It sends the wrong 
message to society, it encourages reckless behavior, and it invites the 
Samaritan’s dilemma.  Critics point to 1984, when the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) injected $4.5 billion into an ailing 
Continental Illinois to save it from bankruptcy, as the start of modern federal 
meddling.55  Five years later the federal government stepped in again to save 
the Savings and Loan industry and to protect U.S. banks against defaults 
from foreign governments.56  Each of these interventions cost upwards of 
$90 billion in 1989 dollars.57
Among the most vocal in opposing such governmental intervention is 
Jeffrey Miron, senior lecturer in economics at Harvard.  He writes: 
“Government purchase of bank stock, therefore, is a transfer from taxpayers 
to people who took huge risks and lost. . . .  [This] will generate even greater 
problems down the line.  It is time for the government to do the one thing it 
does well: nothing at all.”58  Underlying this criticism is a faith in financial 
markets to devise solutions to prevent further crashes.  Providing excessive 
risk-takers with a safety net, opponents of the bailout argue, only encourages 
riskier behavior, and future abuses are sure to result.59  As David I. Levin, 
professor of economics at U.C. Berkeley commented to Bloomberg News, 
“The structure is designed for the Treasury to be the first line of defense. . . .  
A whole lot of people made money supposedly by putting their capital at 
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risk, and those are supposed to be the first line of defense, that’s how 
capitalism works.”60
B.  The Plan Is Badly Flawed 
The objections that the plan is badly flawed are structural more than 
philosophical.  Indeed, some initially opposed the plan because of its 
secrecy, and some opposed it later for a perceived lack of direction.61  Nobel 
laureate and Columbia University professor of economics Joseph Stiglitz has 
opposed the plan for its failure to address underlying causes.  During the 
hectic aftermath to Lehman’s collapse, he commented: “There is a kind of 
suggestion in the Paulson proposal that if only we provide enough money to 
financial markets, this problem will disappear. . . .  But that does nothing to 
address the fundamental problem of bleeding foreclosures and the holes in 
the balance sheets of banks.”62  [Once again I am baffled. He is being 
quoted, and he is not quoting anyone else.] These opponents of the plan 
acknowledge the pragmatism of coming to the aid of our banks, but they 
object to the lack of practicality with which policymakers are executing their 
plan.  Opponents also argue that even if the government buys an equity stake 
in companies instead of just absorbing “toxic debt,” the public will suffer.63  
Banking decisions will be politically influenced and inefficient, and the 
federal government’s vast holdings will distort financial markets.  Still 
others contend that the current plan will waste money in a trickle-down 
attack on the sub-prime problem.64  It would be better, some say, to buy the 
toxic loans and work out mortgages to reduce defaults, thus securing the 
banks’ health from the bottom up.  While this approach has merit, even its 
proponents acknowledge the enormous difficulty of administering such a 
plan.65
Underlying many such practical concerns is the question: does the 
government have any way of knowing what it is actually buying?  Many 
economists, journalists, and politicians worry that it does not.  The financial 
instruments at the root of the current crisis are not well understood even by 
the men and women who traded them for a living; how, then, will 
government agents be able to properly value them?66  The opponents of 
Paulson’s plan argue that this is a bad deal for the taxpayer whether the 
government buys “toxic debt” or even if it gets equity for its money.  Are 
they right? 
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VI.  DEBATE ANALYSIS 
Proponents of the current plan worry about the leverage that our banking 
institutions have on the economy at large.  Charles Wyplosz writes, “The 
Lehman Brothers story has shown two things—banks cannot be simply 
allowed to go bankrupt and a piecemeal approach will not bring banking 
systems back into minimal functioning condition.  The lesson is that there 
[has] to be a bailout.”67  Again, the approach is pragmatic; the potential for 
severe economic consequences is so great that something must be done.  As 
Ben Bernanke said recently, “You want to put the fire out first and then 
worry about the fire code.”68  According to the proponents of the bailout 
plan, the country no longer has the luxury of worrying about moral hazard.  
Critics of the plan, conversely, populate two camps.  One camp opposes the 
plan based on the philosophical grounds that government intervention causes 
moral hazard and prevents free market solutions.69  The other camp 
acknowledges a need for government intervention, but objects to the 
particulars of the bailout.70
Public opinion on the bailout plan appears divided.  Various polls show 
either strong support or strong aversion to EESA, and the results seem 
largely determined by how the question is framed.  Respondents 
enthusiastically support the plan when they are asked if they favor 
government intervention to ensure stable markets and a healthy economy.71  
The results are much different, however, when the question is, should “the 
government . . . use taxpayers’ dollars to rescue ailing private financial firms 
whose collapse could have adverse effects on the economy and 
market . . . ?”72  [The difference is “ensuring a healthy economy” versus 
“rescuing private firms.”  Everyone is in favor of a healthy economy, while 
many oppose rescuing private firms.  Unfortunately, the “private firms” in 
question are inextricably linked to a “healthy economy.”  On that even the 
critics and proponents of the current plan would agree. 
As for the pundits, it is open season on Wall Street greed.  Wall Street is 
an easy target, though it has gone unmentioned in much of the popular press 
that the principals involved in losing such great fortunes on Wall Street are 
in fact just a handful of individuals.  Merrill Lynch’s losses in the sub-prime 
market stemmed from the investment strategies of only three or four men 
and their actions cost their firm over $10 billion and its autonomy.73  Pundits 
and the public alike have largely overlooked the fact that thousands of Wall 
Street employees who stand to lose their life’s savings are responsible, 
hardworking men and women who bear no responsibility for the current 
crisis.  Likewise there are thousands of shareholders who stand to lose 
substantial investments. 
Much of the debate follows traditional liberal/conservative party lines.  
Free market advocates oppose any and all government intervention; for them 
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the market is everything.  Joseph Stiglitz, who opposes the bailout plan on 
structural grounds, calls such advocates “free market fundamentalists.”74  It 
will be better for everyone in the long run, they argue, to let the market 
determine where the bottom is no matter how much suffering it inflicts on 
the global economy.  The market knows best.  Conversely, modern liberals 
believe that government can be the solution, or at least part of it.75  To 
further confuse the concerned citizen, Nobel laureates and prominent 
academics populate both sides of the debate. 
A recent report on previous government interventions reveals a mixed 
record.76  Government action saved Continental Illinois’ depositors, but 
shareholder equity was almost completely wiped out.77  The Brady Plan 
allowed U.S. banks to restructure foreign debt, but it merely increased the 
burden on foreign borrowers.78  Of the Savings and Loan bailout, the report 
notes: “To the extent that federal intervention led to general confidence in 
financial markets, consumers benefited. . . . [but] direct and indirect costs to 
the private and public sectors was $152.9 billion ($191.4 billion in 2008 
dollars).”79  The Continental Illinois troubles in 1984 eventually led to the 
FDIC Improvement Act (FDICIA) of 1991.80  This act was designed to curb 
excessive risk-taking and thus avoid a similar banking failure in the future.81  
Evidently, this has not been sufficient. 
At the outset of the crisis it appeared that the Treasury would have to 
distinguish between the firms that were merely illiquid, fiscally sound but 
short of cash owing to the credit freeze, from those that were fundamentally 
corrupt, short of cash owing to their own bad business practices and 
unpayable debt.  Yet Paulson and his team feared that in the time it would 
take to conduct a thorough auditing of all the firms involved, the economy 
could collapse.  Instead they made billions of dollars available to all the 
biggest players in an effort to stabilize markets and assuage the fears of 
institutional investors, consumers, and the world at large. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
The debate involves many diverse parties.  It is a cliché to say that it 
affects everyone from Wall Street to Main Street, but it is true.  It is also true 
that those on Main Street may feel aggrieved to face potential tax increases 
or loss of services in order to pay for the bailout, yet those same people may 
well have faced even higher taxes and greater loss of services if government 
had not acted to secure markets. 
It would be wise to take some lessons from the demise of Long-Term 
Capital Management (LTCM), a hedge fund whose collapse in 1998 
threatened the solvency of major investment banks.82  Populated by 
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superstar traders and Nobel laureates, LTCM invested heavily in highly 
leveraged derivatives during a period of low interest rates.  Credit was 
cheap, leverage was high, and regulation was nearly non-existent. 
Their total profits in 1996 were an astounding $2.1 billion.  To put 
this number into perspective, [LTCM] . . . .earned more that year 
than McDonald’s did selling hamburgers all over the world, more 
than Merrill Lynch, Disney, Xerox, American Express, Sears, Nike, 
Lucent, or Gillette—among the best-run companies and best-known 
brands in American business.83
Less than two years later, LTCM lost $4.6 billion in four months.84  
Only an eleventh hour bailout by other private financial institutions, 
organized by the New York branch of the Fed, averted a chain reaction of 
even heavier losses.85  Yet banks with skin in the game learned nothing.  
Just ten years later the recipe for disaster was the same, but this time the 
bailout costs started at over $370 billion, not the $3.65 billion required to 
stabilize LTCM’s positions.86  The market principals, left to regulate 
themselves, merely repeated their mistakes of the recent past, only on a 
much grander and more damaging scale.  Laissez-faire has not served the 
economy well.  As Roger Lowenstein notes, “The Fed’s two-headed 
policy—head in the sand before a crisis, intervention after the fact—is more 
misguided when viewed as one single policy.  The government’s emphasis 
should always be on prevention, not on active intervention.”87
It might be better for the country in the long run to let bad businesses 
fail, but no economist can predict the depth or duration that such “short-
term” suffering would entail.  Indeed, many economists who advocate such 
an approach are shockingly oblivious to the domino effect.  Merrill Lynch 
found a last minute buyer out of desperation as the financial markets quaked, 
but one day later Lehman Brothers was not so lucky and the subsequent 
fallout was severe.88  Investor confidence was crippled, capital evaporated 
from money market funds, and investment-banking giants Morgan Stanley 
and Goldman Sachs teetered on the brink of insolvency as trading partners 
abandoned them and traders shorted their stocks during the summer of 
2008.89  A severe credit freeze holds the potential to be too damaging to too 
many economies to risk a social science experiment to find out how much 
pain and unemployment a do-nothing approach to policy would entail.  
Bernanke, an understated man and a scholar of the Great Depression, warned 
against such an approach when he told a meeting of congressmen in 
September 2008, “[If] we [do not] act in a big way, you can expect another 
Great Depression, and this time it is going to be far, far worse.”90
The moral hazard argument might carry more force if financial 
institutions showed any capacity to safeguard the system in the wake of 
disaster.  Sadly, they have not done so.  The biggest banks paid an average 
of over $250 million in 1998 for the privilege of keeping LTCM afloat and 
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the market functioning.91  They had every reason to impose rules that would 
obviate the need to bail out anyone ever again, but they declined to act.  
They gambled, they lost, they suffered—yet they did not learn.  Ten years on 
from the collapse of LTCM, Wall Street’s most powerful bankers repeated 
the same mistakes of the firm they had bailed out with their own money.  
The idea that the market is a perfect self-correcting mechanism is a fantasy. 
The federal government has a long history of interceding in market 
panics, going all the way back to 1792, when Alexander Hamilton 
authorized the Treasury to purchase government bonds to quell our nation’s 
first financial crisis.92  In the past thirty years alone it has intervened in 
Continental Illinois, the Savings and Loan crisis, and LTCM.  Whether 
government’s intervention in those cases inspired greater risk-taking is now 
irrelevant.  The current crisis is far greater than those of the past, and 
government has the popular support to impose regulations that will 
safeguard the public from Wall Street’s brinksmanship.  Unless Wall Street 
is forced to adhere to rigorous standards of responsible and transparent 
investing, there will surely be a repeat of this crisis before long.  History, 
surely, has taught us that much. 
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